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CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE: KILLING OF A MISDEMEANANT
WHO IS FORCIBLY RESISTING ARREST.

In the situations which this note comprehends, there is almost
always the element of self-defense. An officer's right to selfdefense is not questioned and it is not the purpose of this note to
raise any discussion of that right. Any cases relying solely upon
the officer's right of self-defense will not be considered and are
not cited. Numerous cases which primarily are of the self-defense
type are considered where the court partially supported its decision on aspects of the case which relate to the problem under discussion.
Another related topic with which we are a little more concerned, but which is still subordinate to the principal subject is the
homicide of a fleeing misdemeanant. Mere avoidance of arrest by
the misdemeanant or what could be termed non-forcible resistance
is a point ppon which there is little dissension. Generally an officer cannot kill a fleeing misdemeanant with impunity.'
The homicide of a forcibly resisting misdemeanant is not an
uncommon situation, and quite a number of cases may be found attempting to justify such a killing. A search of the cases on the
subject indicates at least two distinct justifications for a homicide
committed in this manner.
The first of these represents a carry over of the old common
law viewpoint of the majesty of the law and the protecting aura it
throws around the officer. Perhaps the classic of this type is
State v. Dierberger.- The following extract is characteristic of the
general theme of the case: 'When, as a general proposition, one refuses to submit to an arrest after he has been touched by the officer,
or endeavors to break away after the arrest is effected, he may lawfully be killed, provided this extreme measure is necessary. In misdemeanors and breaches of the peace, as in cases of felony, if the officer meets with resistance, and the offender is killed in the struggle, the killing will be justified .. . The officer, when making an
arrest may, of course, defend himself, as may any other person who
is assaulted; but the law does not stop here. The officer must of
necessity be the aggressor. His mission is not accomplished when
he wards off the assault. He must press forward and accomplish
his object. He is not bound to put off the arrest until a more favorable time. Because of these duties devolved upon him the law
Cobb v. State, 19 Ala. App. 345, 97 So. 779 (1923); Deatherage
v. State, 194 Ark. 513, 108 S.W. 2d 904 (1937); Vaughn v. State, 54
Okla. Cr. 59, 14 P. 2d 239 (1932); see Siler v. Commonwealth, 280
Ky. 830, 834-835, 134 S.W. 2d 945, 947 (1939).
'96 Mo. 666, 10 S.W. 168 (1888).
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'
throws around him a special protection." There is something to be
said for this point of view, but it has an inherent weakness, too
much depends upon the officer, and the books contain numerous
illustrations where his judgment in making an arrest was so poor
that he was convicted of murder or manslaughter.' If for no other
reason than to protect the officer from himself, there should be some
stopping point in the amount of force the officer can use.
In Kentucky the courts apparently take cognizance, albeit tacit
and unofficial, of the difficulty of an officer in the enforcement of
his duties. One might say that they lean over backwards to safeguard the officer when he has acted not too wisely, but too well.
The only guide given by statute or code is a short section in the
Kentucky Criminal Code. Section 43 reads: "No unnecessary force
or violence shall be used in making the arrest." From this broad
statement the courts cannot be wholly blamed for their broad interpretation. Consequently no surprise is occasioned by the holding
in some of the latest cases that where a misdemeanant resists arrest
by force or violence, the officer may use such force as is necessary, or
appears necessary, to overcome such forcible resistance, even to the
taking of life, and the officer's right is not limited to the single

ground of self-defense.'
The question, reduced to its barest essentials, becomes one of
what amount of force is necessary, or appears necessary, and the
difficulty one has in answering that question is indicative of the
ambiguity of the law.
The second group of cases seems to turn on the point that a misdemeanant by his very act of resisting arrest becomes a felon, and
the officer is permitted to use all measures he could lawfully take to
ensure the arrest of a felon.
The kinds of resistance a misdemeanant uses may be stated as
(1) armed and (2) physical.
The case of Reed v. Commonwealth" is a good example of the
armed resistance type. There the officer was attempting to arrest
the deceased for the commission of a misdemeanor. In doing so, the
misdemeanant shot at the officer, which is a felony in Kentucky,"
and the court held that this constituted a felony committed in the
presence of the officer and authorized him to arrest the deceased
96 Mo. 666, , 10 S.W. 168, 171 (1888); These cases follow
the same theory: State of North Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 734, 738
(W. D. N. C. 1896); State v. Dunning, 177 N. C. 559, 98 S. E. 530
(1919); State v. Garrett, 60 N. C. 144, 84 Am. Dec. 359 (1863).
' State v. Coleman, 186 Mo. 151, 84 S.W. 978 (1905); Roe v. State,
55 Tex. Cr. R. 128, 115 S.W. 593 (1909); Carter v. State, 30 Tex. App.
551, 17 S.W. 1102 (1891).
'Woods v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 596, 139 S.W. 2d 439 (1940);
Siler v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 830, 134 S.W. 2d 945 (1939); Mays
v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky. 691, 99 S.W. 2d 801 (1936); Hatfield v.
Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 573, 59 S.W. 2d 540 (1933).
6
7 125 Ky. 126, 100 S. W. 856 (1907).
Ky. R. S. 435.170.
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upon a felony charge, with the consequent protection, aside from
self defense, which is given by the law to an officer in making
arrests for offenses of that character. It seems clear that an officer
faced with making an arrest in the face of armed resistance is justified in taking even the most extreme measures if necessary to assure the arrest. The view that a felony has been committed in his
presence is a logical and sound rationalization, and is supported in
several other cases.'
The recent case of Scott v. Commonwealth' apparently goes
much farther than such cases as Reed v. Commonwealth. The court
in its decision does not clearly distinguish the situations where the
misdemeanant has used mere physical force from those in which
armed force was used.
The facts of the case were that the appellant, a city police officer, had encountered one Wiley Ball for the fourth time in one
night, having previously broken up a disturbance caused by Ball
and his companions, having tried to arrest him, but Ball had fled.
Later the appellant and a fellow officer found Ball in an automobile
apparently in a drunken stupor. They failed to arouse him and were
starting the car preparatory to taking him to jail, when he raised
up and said he wasn't going anywhere. The officers got out and
ordered Ball to come with them, and as the second officer walked
around the front of the car to the opposite side, he heard the appellant shout to Ball to "drop that knife" and he heard the three or four
shots that followed this command. On going around the car he
saw the appellant pick up the knife and saw that Ball was dead.
The opinion of the court contains this statement: "But where the
misdemeanant forcibly resists arrest, he becomes a felon, and the law
not only endows the officer with the right of self-defense, but imposes upon him the duty to prevent the escape by employing such
means as may be necessary so to do, even to the extent of taking the
life of the prisoner.""
The case, of course, involves the element of self-defense. However, with that element removed from consideration, the case becomes one of homicide in the course of the arrest of a resisting misdemeanant. The only saving feature about the court's language is not
made clear. If the court meant that by offering armed resistance, as
in this case the drawing of a knife, the misdemeanant became a
felon, then the decision is,
no different than the one in Reed v. Commonwealth.
' Cornett v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 236, 248 S.W. 540 (1923);
Partin and Allen v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 840, 248 S.W. 489 (1923);
Collins v. Commonwealth, 192 Ky. 412, 233 S.W. 896 (1921); Rawlings
and Spivey v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 401, 230 S.W. 529 (1921);
Hickey v. Commonwealth, 185 Ky. 570, 215 S.W. 431 (1919).
'301 Ky. 127, 190 S.W. 2d 345 (1945). "
"' Scott v. Com., 301 Ky. 127, 131-132, 190 S.W. 2d 345, 347.
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But the court does not say this. It says, "Where the misdemeanant forcibly resists arrest he becomes a felon,"' without any differentiation between bodily resistance and armed resistance.
It does not take a great deal of thought to see the dangerous consequences of this language. The possibilities of its abuse are of far
greater significance than the likelihood that a misdemeanant might
go unpunished. Critics of this last statement will say that it is based
upon sentimentalism, and will speak of the fear of anarchy reigning
supreme and that brute force will obstruct the wheels of justice. All
of these are persuasive but in reality they merely becloud the issue.
It is not proposed that the arrest be left undone, or, as has been said
in a fashion more picturesque than logical, that the strong arm of
the law be paralyzed.
Let it be said, rather, that the law recognizes the sanctity of
human life, and aside from any sentimentality or fear of the triumph
of brute force, it should be remembered that it is only extreme necessity that will justify the taking of life. Such a view will do more to
preserve the majesty of the law than will the wanton destruction of
human life.
Let the officer summon assistance in order to take the resister
and only in self-defense exact the final extremity. Would that not
preserve the dignity of the law and yet temper it with the modern
concept of the value of human life? What if the misdemeanant does
escape in the meantime and is never taken? If he were taken, he
would only be subjected to a trifling fine or a short imprisonment.
Can it be said that the state gains more by exterminating him than
it would lose by permitting his continued existence? Why not confine the officer's right to kill to effect arrest to the most serious
crimes, crimes known to be seriously harmful to the state and whose
perpetrators must be taken at all costs.
Mute testimony that the law does not favor the taking of life
except as a measure of last resort is the presence of a club hanging
at the officer's side. If it had been expected that every offender be
killed if he resisted arrest there would have been no need to furnish
the officer with anything other than a pistol.
We have said that in the case of resisting with armed force the
offender does become a felon. As to mere bodily resistance the same
conclusion cannot so readily be made, if at all. The law is not clear
on this subject. The problem is so inextricably interwoven with
self-defense, that it is difficult to see where one ends and the other
begins. As is pointed out by Clark, "...
Though in theory the distinction between killing to effect the arrest and killing only in selfdefense may be important, the result in the actual case is the same.
*..It will never be apparently necessary to kill to effect the arrest
until the officer's life is in apparen t danger, for until that time it does
" Id.
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not appear but that a little more force than is being used will be suf'
ficient to effect the arrest without killing."
In the cases read in preparing this note, aside from armed resistance, a misdemeanant resisting arrest became a felon only by the
aid of statute. If legislation is enacted to make this particular offense a felony,' it is a good indication that generally such an offense
is not, of itself, a felony. Two Vermont cases1' held that resistance
to lawful arrest amounts to a breach of the peace, the court saying
in effect that if the circumstances justify an officer in arresting
without a warrant, it is the duty of the arrested person to submit
and his resistance constitutes a breach of the peace.
It would seem to follow from the above discussion that, removing
the element of self-defense from discussion, a misdemeanant who resists arrest with armed force becomes a major felon who has committed an atrocious felony in the presence of the officer. If the officer is forced to kill him to effect the arrest under such circumstances he will not be criminally liable. If, however, the resisting
misdemeanant does not use armed force, but merely physical force
in resisting the arrest, he remains guilty of no more than a misdemeanor and if the officer kills him to effect the arrest, he is criminally liable. It is not sound social policy to permit an officer to take

the life of a misdemeanant in order to effect his arrest.
DOYLE B. INMAx
'2 CLARK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1918) sec. 17, n. 50.
"KY. STAT. (CARROLL, 1936), Sec. 1148a7, was interpreted
make forcible resistance to lawful arrest a felony. In Loveless
Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 82, 43 S. W. 2d 348 (1931) this was held
be a violation of Sec. 51 of the Constitution of Kentucky.
'4 State v. Jasmin, 105 Vt. 531, 168 Atl. 545 (1933); State
Mancini, 91 Vt. 507, 101 Atl. 581 (1917).
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